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Book Reviews
In Pagans in the Promised Land, Steven Newcomb
endeavors “to decode the hidden biblical, or, more
specifically, Old Testament, background of the Johnson ruling.” He argues that Indian law scholars fail to
appreciate the religious dimensions of Marshall’s decision, and contends that “it is accurate to refer to the
main conception that runs through the Johnson ruling
as Christian discovery rather than simply discovery
or European discovery.” Newcomb, who is Shawnee/
Lenape, also breaks new ground by making use of
“the tools and methods of cognitive theory” in order to
expose—and challenge—the “negative, oppressive, and
dominating concepts that have been mentally and, from
an indigenous perspective, illegitimately imposed on
our existence.”
The book begins with a primer on cognitive theory,
a “new way of thinking about thinking” that emphasizes the use of conceptual metaphors, image-schemas,
radial categories, and idealized cognitive models
(ICMs). Although the terminology of cognitive science
is somewhat daunting, Newcomb explains how the
Christian nations of Europe idealized (and rationalized)
the colonization of the New World. Separate chapters
explain the “mental process of negation” and describe
the “conqueror” and “chosen people–promised land”
cognitive models. While other scholars have explored
the religious underpinnings of the doctrine of discovery,
Newcomb offers new insights by consciously connecting “the biblical basis of the claimed right of Christian
discovery and dominion” with the “mentality of empire
and domination.”
Newcomb asserts that Johnson v. M’Intosh is “quite
diabolical” because the decision uses “Christian religion
and Christian nationalism, combined with the cognitive
powers of imagination and assumption, to construct
a subjugating reality for American Indians.” One can
argue, however, that the characterization of Marshall’s
opinion as “diabolical” is not only ironic (given the word’s
association with the devil) but unfair. Given the assumptions that underlie the “conqueror” and “chosen people”
models, the book does not explain why Marshall held that
discovery “diminished”—rather than eliminated—the
Native rights of property and self-government.
By its use of cognitive theory, Pagans in the Promised
Land presents a new perspective on the doctrine of discovery. Newcomb forcefully argues that an essential part
of the decolonizing process “must occur in the mind.” His
book sets forth a fresh way to think about, and decode,
federal Indian law. Blake A. Watson, School of Law,
University of Dayton.
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American Indians and the Law. By N. Bruce Duthu.
New York: Viking, 2008. xxx + 270 pp. Notes, bibliography, index. $21.95 cloth, $16.00 paper.
“. . . [T]he question is whether the law ought to be
praised or cursed for what it has done to the Indian.” This
was the seminal and troubling question raised by Petra
Shattuck and Jill Norgren in their well-constructed book
Partial Justice: Federal Indian Law in a Liberal Constitutional System in 1991. It is a question that has bedeviled
Native peoples and non-Natives for decades.
N. Bruce Duthu is the latest academic to weigh in
on this contentious debate. Drawing on a wealth of historical, political, and especially legal data, Duthu charts
a balanced course through the uneven ground of treaty,
constitutional, statutory, and case law to “show how
federal Indian law reflects the paradoxes and tensions of
our past but also contains the critical elements that could
be useful in developing a more respectful and mutually
beneficial framework for political relations.”
The tidy book is divided into four coequal parts that
focus respectively on Native sovereignty; Native territoriality—the ways and means that Indigenous peoples both
lost and retained ownership of their lands; Native-state
philosophical tensions—the battle between individual
civil rights and collective tribal rights; and Natives and
intergovernmental relations—particularly as played out
in the diplomatic arena.
Besides wrestling with the broad question of how “the
law” should be viewed in its application to Native peoples,
the other major question suffusing this study is “where
and how do Indian tribes sit within the architecture of
American constitutional democracy?” While admitting
that there is still no “clear answer” to this foundational
question, Duthu acknowledges that Native nations are in a
position of what he mildly terms a “legal deficit” vis-à-vis
the U.S. He attributes this “deficit” to two sets of reasons:
the federal government’s use of a particularized creation
story about nation-building and national identity that
diminished and marginalized Indigenous peoples as savages and incompetents; and omnipresent racism that laces
many laws, policies, and court cases. Evidence abounds
that these two factors were indeed important, but I am
not convinced they have sufficient explanatory power to
characterize adequately the ongoing political and legal
conundrums in which Native nations find themselves in
relation to the U.S. today.
Throughout the book Duthu effectively employs a
number of case studies that help to situate the abstract legal doctrines in real world contexts, and he offers several
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solid prescriptions that should be considered if the U.S.
wants to develop more amicable relations with Native
peoples. These include restarting the treaty process, disavowing the absolutist definition of congressional plenary
power, and clarifying the relationship between tribal nations and state governments.
Finally, as solid as the book is, I have a few minor
complaints. First, it was disappointing to see the overused
“pendulum” metaphor used yet again to describe federal
Indian policy. There really was nothing pendulum-like
about federal policies that were aimed at Indigenous
peoples since their legal, economic, cultural, and political conditions dramatically deteriorated once sustained
contact occurred, with only an occasional blip in favor of
a particular tribe or nation or individual Indian.
Second, and most problematic, Duthu, like many who
are deeply invested in the American legal system, find
themselves in a quandary. On the one hand, legal professionals must acknowledge that the law has been the primary weapon used by the U.S. to elevate itself to a superior
position regarding Native peoples. On the other, Duthu
claims that despite the preponderance of “ideological and
institutional forces” that constrain and frustrate tribal nations in the U.S., “the significant point to take away from
all this is that none of these barriers are really insurmountable.” But the data he relied on and the history he explored
suggest that there may indeed be an element of insolubility
about Indigenous-state relations that will make it difficult
ever to clarify the relationship permanently in a manner
that shows genuine respect for Native sovereignty.
Notwithstanding these gripes, I emphatically recommend this book to those interested in learning the history
and contemporary status of Native nations and the ambivalent role that “the law” has played and continues to
play, in addressing Indigenous status. David E. Wilkins,
Department of American Indian Studies, University of
Minnesota.
American Indians and State Law: Sovereignty, Race,
and Citizenship, 1790-1880. By Deborah A. Rosen. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007. xvii + 340 pp.
Notes, bibliography, index. $55.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.
Deborah Rosen details the historical relationship
between states and their American Indian populations.
She argues that while states set aside some racist understandings in order to admit Indians into the state populace
through voting rights and state citizenship, they also used
these same instruments as methods of assimilation to limit
tribal sovereignty and citizenship and to take tribal lands.
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While there was no question the federal government
reserved the right to deal with tribal nations through both
the Indian Commerce Clause and the Non Intercourse
Acts, states still found some room to determine the political status of individual Indians. Because of the federal
government’s focus on the reservation system, which attempted to separate tribes from non-Indians, Indians who
did not live on a reservation, or who were not citizens of
a treaty tribe occupied an ambiguous legal identity for
states. States sometimes used that ambiguity to exercise
state jurisdiction and control over them.
Rosen also focuses on race laws, however, noting
during the Antebellum period and immediately after the
Civil War that racist institutions and thought countered
state assimilationist movements. Therefore the struggle
in the states emerged as an issue of exclusion or assimilation. For example, when states barred Indians from exercising the rights of citizenship, such as the 1857 Nebraska
law preventing Indians from testifying in any lawsuit,
exclusion trumped assimilation.
Elsewhere in the country assimilation was the trend.
In the post-Civil War period, particularly in Northern
states as far west as Minnesota, the state enfranchisement of Indians moved forward. While states did not
read any federal laws or treaties as guaranteeing a right
to vote, they did see enfranchisement of Indians as a way
to extend state jurisdiction right up to the limits of federal
jurisdiction. This process was relatively slow, however,
and had other implications.
Specifically, the motives behind this movement towards enfranchisement were not always clear. While
some proponents did believe in equal rights, state citizenship was also a way to distribute communal tribal lands
and resources to non-Indians and the state. Incorporation
into the state was antithetical to maintaining tribal relations and tribal governments. North Dakota, for example,
initially only allowed Indians to vote if they had severed
tribal relations. However, by the 1880s, the federal government’s renewed interest in assimilation of Indians
pushed the states out of the picture in determining Indian
political status. By 1924, the federal government declared
all Indians citizens, regardless of tribal affiliation.
While the role of the federal government and tribal
relations has long been documented, the role of the state
and the immediacy and daily conflict of early state/tribal
relations is less well known. Rosen’s book provides valuable research and insights on the early state laws, cases,
and constitutions in relation to Indian peoples. Kathryn
E. Fort, Indigenous Law and Policy Center, Michigan
State University College of Law.

